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This paper studies the evolution of hurricane insurance in Florida over the last decades. 
Hurricanes (and other natural catastrophes) are typically referred to as “uninsurable” risks. 
The more exposed property owners find it difficult to obtain insurance cover from the private 
market and/or can do so only at premiums that substantially exceed their expected claims 
costs. The state of Florida has reacted to the incapacity of the private sector to insure 
hurricane risks at reasonable premium levels with the creation of Citizens Property Insurance 
Corporation (an insurer of last resort) and the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund. Their 
existence has resulted in substantial premium reductions for the Florida property owners. 
Both institutions have the possibility of spreading the costs of a major hurricane over a (very) 
large number of policy holders through after the event compulsory assessments. The risk 
borne by each individual property owner is thus reasonably small, with substantial benefits for 
consumers as a group. Looking forward the challenge to the policy maker will be to fine-tune 
the operation (premium structure) of these two institutions so as to increase their political 
acceptance. To this end it will be necessary to limit the implicit subsidy of the “bad risks” 
through the “good risks”. 
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0   Introduction 
 
Florida  is  the  State  in  the  US which  is  the  most  subject  to  being  hit  by  hurricanes,  and 
resulting damage, particularly over the last 2 decades, has been extensive (and expensive). 
[Andrew (1992), Charley, Frances, Ivan and Jeanne (2004), Wilma and Katrina (2005)].  
 
The inability or unwillingness of private insurance companies to offer  hurricane cover to 
property  owners  in  the  more  exposed  areas  of  Florida  at  premiums  (and  other  insurance 
conditions) that are considered affordable (by the property owners and/or the politicians), has 
led to various types of state intervention (which will be discussed below). In 2008 the Senate 
of Florida has set up a Task Force to study how the regulation of the property insurance 
market in Florida should evolve. The report of the Task Force is due in the course of  2009.  
 
In March 2008 the Wharton Risk Management and Decision Process Center published an 
ambitious and voluminous (close to 400 pages) book entitled “Managing Large Scale Risks in 
a New Era of Catastrophes”.
1 Its declared purpose is to provide “a series of in-depth analyses 
of the efficiency and equity of current disaster insurance markets” and “the impact of state-
based regulations on the insurance protection and the loss distributions among different stake 
holders”.  In  the  Preface  and  Executive  Summary  the  authors  write  “Now  is  the  time  to 
develop and implement economically sound policies and strategies for managing the risk and 
consequences of future disasters” (Wharton, 2008, p.i).  
 
Unfortunately, the focus of the study is quite narrow when it comes to the kind of economic 
policies it tends to advocate. The most obvious symptom of this is the fact that certain types 
of state intervention which have proved their worth in several European countries for decades 
(and sometimes centuries) are not even mentioned in the study. The best known examples in 
this respect are the local monopoly property insurance providers in large parts of Switzerland, 
the  monopoly  state  reinsurance  company  for  catastrophes  in  Spain  (the  Consorcio  de 
Compensacion de Seguros, created at the end of the civil war), the state guaranteed reinsurer 
in France (the Caisse Centrale de Reassurance, created in the 1970s) etc
2. In a follow-up paper 
we plan to study to what extent the experiences in these (and other) European countries might 
be of relevance for the US policy maker.   
 
Even if one concentrates only on the institutional framework as it currently exists in the US, 
the focus of the Wharton study is still quite narrow. The authors have a sharp eye when it 
comes to identifying potential drawbacks of state interventions in the catastrophe insurance 
market. At the same time they tend to gloss over the (obvious) shortcomings of competitive 
markets when it comes to providing satisfactory (and cost efficient) insurance solutions to 
property  owners  with  an  above  average  exposure  to  hurricanes  (and  other  natural 
catastrophes).  
 
Implementing  the  policy  recommendations  of  the  Wharton  study  in  Florida  might  well 
increase the importance of the private insurance sector when it comes to providing hurricane 
insurance in Florida. There is, however, a good chance that it would do so only at a very high 
                                                 
1   In 2009 the report was published by MIT Press as “At War with the Weather : Managing Large-Scale 
Risks in a New Era of Catastrophes”. 
2   Thomas von Ungern-Sternberg’s  book “Efficient Monopolies: The Limits of Competition in the 
European Property Insurance Market “, Oxford University Press (2004), summarizes the experiences of 
these and other countries in some depth.    3 
cost to the property owners; and it would do so at a time when the financial situation of many 
households in Florida is already severely strained.  
 
The  need  for  public  sector  intervention  in  natural  disaster  insurance  markets  has  been 
discussed  as  early  as  Kunreuther  (1974).  Jaffee  and  Russell  (1997)  argue  that  the 
characteristics of natural disaster events “do not seem sufficient to cause failure of private 
markets” (p. 206). For them the key issue is the incompleteness of financial markets. Jametti 
and von Ungern-Sternberg (2005) show, for the case of Switzerland, that similar levels of 
insurance can be provided more cost-efficiently by public providers. Several authors have 
proposed systems of public-private partnerships. Gollier (2005) discusses several aspects of 
free-market  inefficiencies  (e.g.  transaction  costs,  limited  liability  and  asymmetric 
information) in the context of disaster insurance, advocating that the government play the role 
of  insurer  of  last  resort.  Similarly,  Kunreuther  and  Pauly  (2006)  analyzing  assistance  to 
victims of Hurricane Kathrine propose a mandatory comprehensive disaster insurance, with 




The purpose of this paper is to briefly summarize the evolution of the regulatory framework 
for hurricane insurance in Florida over the last 40 years, and provide a more in-depth analysis 
of the impact the regulatory intervention has had on the availability and cost of insurance. In 
doing so, we correct some of the major oversights in the Wharton (2008) study. We hope our 
analysis can assist the Florida legislator in the delicate task it is facing: adapt the current 
regulatory framework in such a way that the property owners continue to be able to obtain 
insurance cover at affordable premiums, while at the same time limiting the strain put on the 
State’s finances when the next major hurricane strikes (as it inevitably will).  
 
The  rest  of  this  paper  is  structured  as  follows:  Section  I  briefly  summarizes  the  major 
milestones in the evolution of the Florida hurricane insurance market. Section II discusses the 
impact of the current institutional framework on the main stake holders. Section III ends with 
some concluding remarks. 
 
 
 I   Main developments in the Florida hurricane insurance market 
  
 
A)   Conceptual background  
 
There are three factors which put hurricanes, like several other kinds of natural catastrophes, 
in the category of risk that is typically referred to as “uninsurable”
4.  
 
a)  Damages may occur infrequently but they can be substantial.  
b)  Damages are typically concentrated in one geographic region (and most buildings in 
that region are affected to some extent).  
c)  It is hard to objectively estimate the expected damage cost.  
 
 
                                                 
3   One issue that is frequently neglected in these public-private partnerships is the issue of risk-selection. 
Jametti and von Ungern-Sternberg (2009) discuss risk selection in several public-private partnership, 
among them France and Florida. 
4   See e.g. Jaffee and Russell (1997).   4 
The term “uninsurable” was coined by the insurance industry itself. It refers to the fact that 
private insurance companies usually try to avoid insuring risks of this kind or do so only at 
premiums that are substantially higher than expected claims costs.  
 
From a conceptual perspective, there are two kinds of mechanisms underlying insurance: risk 
pooling and risk spreading.  
 
Risk pooling refers to the idea that the cost of risk can be substantially reduced if a large 
number of independently distributed risks is pooled. Risk pooling does not work well in the 
case  of  hurricanes  because  the  risks  in  any  given  geographic  area  are  not  independently 
distributed (i.e. they are highly correlated).
5   
 
Risk spreading refers to the idea that the cost of risk can be reduced if the risk can be spread 
over a sufficiently large number of individuals each holding a small portion of the risk. As we 
shall discuss in more detail later on, in practice the mechanism of risk spreading does not by 
itself seem sufficient to ensure a well functioning competitive market for hurricane insurance. 
One of the major advantages of state interventions in this market is the fact that the State can 




B)   The evolution of hurricane insurance in Florida 
 
Historically, the first attempt by the State of Florida to improve on the performance of the 
private  insurance  industry  was  the  creation  of  the  “Florida  Windstorm  Underwriting 
Association” (FWUA) in 1970, to cover wind (i.e. hurricane) risks in the Florida Keys. The 
FWUA has since expanded its activities to 29 of the 35 coastal counties in Florida. Its official 
purpose was to “provide Florida citizens adequate wind and hail coverage, when it is not 
available in the insurance market place, and pay insured claims when losses occur”.  The 
FWUA  like  its  successor  organisations  (see  below)  all  suffer  from  the  same  type  of 
ambiguity: on the one hand the legislator wishes to provide affordable insurance to those 
customers unable to obtain such (i.e. affordable) cover from the private insurance sector. On 
the  other  hand  the  law  clearly  mandated  the  FWUA  to  “charge  rates  sufficient  to  cover 
losses...”. The uncertainty surrounding the extent and frequency of hurricane losses in the 
future is substantial. It is thus open to some considerable freedom of interpretation if and to 
what extent the FWUA might at any point be deviating from its legal mandate.   
 
The two most obvious potential explanations why the legislator might want to intervene in the 
hurricane insurance market are that:  
 
a)   he believes the private insurance industry to (substantially) overestimate the expected 
cost of hurricane damage, or 
 
b)   he considers the mark-up over and above expected claims costs the private insurance 
industry charges to bear this risk to be so high, that a more cost efficient alternative in 
the form of state-supplied insurance is financially viable.  
 
   
                                                 
5   Pollner (2001) extensively discusses the issues of risk pooling in natural disasters. 
6   Freeman et al. (2003) illustrate the difficulty to spread risk effectively for the case of developing 
countries,.   5 
Given the recent experience in Florida there is a third consideration that must be born in mind.   
 
c)   If the private insurance companies charge the customers who are likely to suffer a 
major hurricane damage (with a low probability) what they consider to be “adequate” 
insurance premiums, they would be able to accumulate substantial reserves if there are 
several years in a row without major hurricanes. Some insurance companies might 
then be tempted to pay out these accumulated profits in the form of bonuses, dividends 
or  share  buy-backs.  Should  a  major  hurricane  strike  they  would  not  then  have 
sufficient reserves to cover their claims costs.   
 
a.   Hurricane Andrew (1992) 
 
In 1992 Hurricane Andrew, with an estimated total damage of the order of US$ 25 billion 
(US$ 16 billion of which was insured) left the insurance industry in Florida with substantial 
losses. This had two major consequences:  
 
a)   11  small  insurance  companies  with  insufficient  reserves  and/or  reinsurance  cover 
went  bankrupt,  leaving  the  Florida  Insurance  Guaranty  Association  (and  thus 
ultimately the other insurance companies of Florida and their customers) to foot the 
bill.  
 
b)  Second, the remaining insurers took a new critical look at the exposure they were 
facing and tried to (drastically) reduce the number of policies and the extent of cover 
they were providing.  
 
To prevent the insurance companies from leaving the sinking ship (and the house owners with 
risks that could financially ruin them for the rest of their lives) the State of Florida took  
several measures:  
 
1.  It passed an urgent law limiting the extent of policy cancellations to 5% per annum 
maximum at the state level and 10% per annum maximum at the county level, i.e. it 
tried to force the private insurance industry to provide cover in Florida over and above 
the level they would choose voluntarily.  This measure was accompanied by restrictive 
rules as to the size of the premium increases they could impose on their customers.   
 
2.  The possibilities of forcing private insurance companies to insure risks they no longer 
want  to  hold  are  of  course  limited.  To  make  insuring  hurricane  risks  in  Florida  a 
financially  more  attractive  prospect,  the  State  in  1993  (i.e.  just  one  year  after 
Hurricane  Andrew)  created  the  Florida  Hurricane  Catastrophe  Fund  (FHCF).  Its 
purpose  was  to  allow  the  individual  insurance  companies  to  reinsure  part  of  their 
hurricane risk portfolio with the State. The reinsurance conditions offered by the state 
were  substantially  more  attractive  than  those  available  on  the  private  reinsurance 
market (see below).  
 
In spite of these measures, the major insurance companies' active in Florida reduced their 
exposure substantially. The largest insurer “State Farm Group” reduced its market share from 
30.5% in 1992 to 20.1% in the year 2000.
7 The second largest “Allstate Insurance Group” 
reduced its market share from 20.4% in 1992 to 11.2% in the year 2000.
8 Even these massive 
                                                 
7   It is interesting to note that in State Farm has left the Floridian market altogether by 2009. 
8   Wharton (2008) p.69.   6 
reductions  (the  two  groups  reduced  their  customer  base  by  one  third  and  one  half 
respectively) do not fully reflect the extent of turmoil on the market. The aggregate data do 
not indicate the extent to which these reductions in the customer base were concentrated on 
the high risk areas. 
 
3.  To fill the gap left by the private insurance industry, the State in December 1992 (i.e. 
just months after Hurricane Andrew) created the “Florida Residential Property and 
Casualty  Joint  Underwriting  Association”  (JUA).  Its  mission  was  to  provide 
residential property insurance coverage “for applicants who are in good faith entitled, 
but are unable, to procure insurance through the voluntary market.”
9 
 
As a result of the bankruptcies and the private insurance companies’ drive to reduce their 
exposure on the Florida market, the size of both the FWUA and the JUA exploded in the 
aftermath of Hurricane Andrew. By 1996 their joint total exposure had risen to over $180 
billion.  
 
When  Florida  was  not  struck  by  a  major  hurricane  for  some  years,  insurance  companies 
became more optimistic once more and were willing to take back large parts of the JUA 
portfolio. Its market fell from 950 thousand policies with a total exposure of US$ 100 billion 
in 1996 to a mere 60 thousand policies with a total exposure of just below 10 billion US$ in 
the year 2000.   
 
 
b.   The 2004-2005 hurricane seasons 
 
From a media perspective the 2004 hurricane season was less spectacular than Hurricane 
Andrew, but it left a deep impression on the insurance industry. There are two reasons for 
this.  
 
First, this was the first time that Florida was struck by a series of violent hurricanes in the 
same year. While hurricanes Charley, Frances, Ivan and Jeanne individually caused nowhere 
near the damage left by Andrew, all four of them together still cost the insurers more than 25 
billion US$ in Florida alone. They became aware that they were not just menaced by “a big 
one” but also the possibility that several medium size events might leave deep scars in their 
balance sheets in any given year.  
 
Second, it had always been assumed that the worst hurricanes would strike from the Atlantic 
coast. The 2004 hurricanes did not follow this pattern. They came from both the Atlantic and 
the Gulf of Mexico. The insurance industry had to radically redraw its risk maps. 
 
When Hurricanes Wilma and Katrina (both category 5) struck just one year later, it became 
even more obvious that any historical evidence one had about the frequency of hurricanes 
should be used with great circumspection at best. The indications that the hurricane danger in 
Florida might have increased massively as a result of climate change (or other factors?) were 
too  strong  to  be  ignored,  and  the  insurance  companies  reacted  by  once  again  massively 
reducing their exposure and increasing their premiums. The average premium doubled from 
723$  in  2002  to  1465$  in  2007.    The  premium  increase  would  have  been  even  more 
substantial had not the FHCF once again increased the reinsurance cover it offered.  
                                                 
9   Florida Statutes  627.351(6)(2a).   7 
C)   The Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund  
 
The basic structure of the FHCF is as follows: Participation in the Fund is compulsory for all 
insurance companies writing property insurance in Florida with a total exposure of more than 
10 million dollars. In each year the insurance companies must cover the first part of their total 
claims  payments  themselves.  If  their  claims  payments  exceed  this  minimum  amount  the 
FHCF will bear a fraction of these additional claims payments. The insurance companies can 
choose (up-front) what part of these additional claims they want to reinsure with the FHCF. 
They are offered three possible levels of reinsurance cover; 45%, 75% or 90%. Essentially 
what the FHCF is offering the insurance companies is a standard non-proportional reinsurance 
contract with an excess the companies have to bear themselves.  
 
One might expect that the compulsory nature of the Fund is to facilitate an indirect subsidy of 
the  “bad  risks”  through  the  “good  risks”.  This  is,  however,  somewhat  at  odds  with  the 
provision  that  the  independent  expert  charged  with  calculating  the  reimbursement  (i.e. 
reinsurance) premiums should see that these are “actuarially indicated” (i.e. fair), taking into 
account location (zip-code), type of construction, type of coverage etc
10. If the premiums were 
actuarially fair, the system should not have any major redistribution effect. However, if this 
were the case, why make participation in the system compulsory?  
 
The total coverage provided by the FHCF was capped at $15 billion per year. This upper limit 
was increased to $28 billion in 2006, in the aftermath of the catastrophic 2004-2005 hurricane 
seasons, when reinsurance cover on the traditional market became both more difficult and 
more expensive to obtain.  
 
Should the FHCF not have sufficient funds to cover its obligations, it has the possibility of 
raising money on the financial markets by issuing “revenue bonds”. To repay these it may 
“levy, by order, an emergency assessment on direct premiums for all property and casuality 
lines of business in Florida.”
11 The annual assessments may not exceed 10% of premium 
income.  The  Fund  further  has  the  possibility  to  directly  increase  its  income  through  an 
emergency assessment in case of large losses in any given calendar year. This surcharge may 
not exceed 6% of the premium income.  
 
The financial markets in the US have practically dried up over the last year, and the US (like 
the  rest  of  the  world)  is  entering  a  major  recession.  As  a  result  there  is  currently  vast 
uncertainty whether the FHCF would in fact be able to rapidly raise the funds (sell the bonds) 
necessary to cover its obligations if Florida were to experience another bad hurricane season 
in the next few years.  
 
 
D)   The Citizens Property Insurance Corporation 
 
The major difference between the FWU (created in 1970) and the JUA (created as an urgent 
measure in the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew) was the fact that the first offered only wind 
cover while the second could supply multi-peril property insurance. There was, however, no 
good reason to maintain these two institutions side by side. They were merged in 2002 to 
create  the  Citizens  Property  Insurance  Corporation  (Citizens).  Like  its  predecessors,  its 
official  purpose  was  to  provide  property  insurance  to  those  house  owners  who  could  not 
                                                 
10   Florida Statutes 627.6628(3)(b). 
11   Florida Statutes 215.555 (FHCF).   8 
obtain cover at an “affordable” premium from the private sector. The term affordable can of 
course  be  interpreted  in  different  ways.  Given  the  political  pressure  to  prevent  property 
insurance premiums from rising too fast, Citizens has in the last few years had the political 
backing necessary to allow it to interpret this mandate quite largely. As a result, it is currently 
the largest property insurer in Florida. 
  
Citizens  subdivides  it  total  customer  base  into  three  categories,  “Personal  Line  Accounts 
(PLA)”,  “Commercial  Line  Accounts  (CLA)”  (both  residential  and  non-residential)  and 
“"High Risk Accounts (HRA)” (located in counties with a high hurricane risk).  
 
The evolution of its “Direct Written Premiums” for each category is summarized in the Table 
below. 
 
Citizens “direct written premiums” by type of account (US$ million) 
 
Account  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007 
HRA  586   714   881  1'275  1'311 
PLA  515   635  669  1'622  1'840 
CLA  70   53  59  505  567 
Total  1'171   1'402  1'609  3'400  3'718 
 
One notes that Citizens’ customer base literally exploded between the years 2005 and 2006, 
i.e. in the aftermath of the 2004-2005 hurricane seasons. The reasons for this development 
will be discussed further on.  
 
Currently Citizens' premium volume of 3.7 billion US$ comes from 1.4 million contracts with 
a total exposure of more than 500 billion US$. It estimates its net exposure from a 100 year 
event to be of the order of 25 billion US$ (for all three categories combined).  
  
One  of  the  specificities  of  Citizens  is  that  it  can  cover  its  deficits  in  each  of  the  above 
mentioned product lines by imposing a compulsory surcharge (an assessment) on existing 
insurance contracts. The modalities of these assessments have been modified in May 2008. In 
the  past,  the  first  regular  assessment  concerned  only  Citizens  own  customers,  and  the 
assessment could not exceed 10% of the premium. As of 2009 this rate has been increased to 
15%.  
 
If this amount was not sufficient to cover Citizens' deficit, it could levy a further surcharge on 
all property insurance policies in Florida. The maximum amount of this assessment was either 
10% of the premium income or 10% of Citizens deficit, whichever was greater. As of 2009 
this rate has been decreased to 6%.  
 
Any  remaining  deficit  incurred  by  Citizens  can  be  financed  through  issue  of  a  “revenue 
bond”. This will then be repaid through multi-year emergency assessments on all property 
insurance policies. The  maximum amount of these  emergency  assessments is 10% of the 
premium income or Citizens' outstanding deficit, whichever is greater.  
 
Citizens  thus  has  a  possibility  which  is  not  available  to  other  “voluntary”  insurance 
companies. It can finance its potential deficits by levying a surcharge on its “competitors” 
customers. It is easy to understand, why the voluntary insurance companies in Florida have 
some misgivings about  this situation. It creates a very un-level competitive playing  field.   9 
While the private insurance companies have to calculate their premiums in such a way as to 
cover  their  expected  damage  cost,  Citizens  could  potentially  deliberately  charge  lower 
premium rates, substantially increase its market share and, in case of a major claims event, 
have a (large) part of its claims cost be financed by its “competitors” customers. The changes 
in the assessment modalities outlined above are clearly designed to shift a larger part of the 
burden of these assessments onto Citizens' own customers.  
 
The asymmetric situation between Citizens and its “competitors”" explains why the legislator 
tried  to  build  in  a  number  of  safeguards,  to  prevent  Citizens  from  exerting  competitive 
pressure on the market.   
 
For both the Personal Line and the Commercial Line insurance, a property owner can become 
a Citizens customer only if the best offer he has obtained from the voluntary market is at least 
15% higher than Citizens' standard rate for this kind of risk.  
 
Voluntary insurance companies are provided financial incentives to buy up parts of Citizens 
customer portfolio. This financial incentive was initially 100 US$ per policy. Of course, a one 
shot payment of this type potentially creates an incentive to buy up the policy, provide the 
customer insurance cover for one year, and then cancel the policy. It is presumably for this 
reason, that the 100 US$ incentive bonus is now pro-rated over a period of 5 years.  
 
Citizens is also mandated to enter into “quota share” agreements with the voluntary insurers: 
If a private insurance company is willing to bear a specified percentage of the risk of some 
part of the portfolio (or an individual customer) it obtains the same percentage of Citizens 
premium income. 
 
Initially, Citizens was not permitted to offer insurance cover for properties with a value of 
more than 1 million US$. The purpose of this provision was to prevent rich individuals from 
building houses in high risk areas and then have the cost of reconstruction after a hurricane 
borne by the general public. The 1 million US$ limit was recently increased to 2 million US$ 
presumably to take into account the massive increase in Florida's property prices. Of course, 
this measure has turned out to be totally misplaced. The subprime loan crisis and the burst of 
the speculative bubble on the US housing market have brought Florida property prices back to 
more reasonable levels. 
 
According  to  Citizens'  Statutes,  “rates  for  coverage  provided  by  the  corporation  shall  be 
actuarially  sound...”
12  Nevertheless  the  rate  increases  Citizens  tried  to  impose  in  2006, 
presumably in order to meet just this requirement, were considered excessive by the legislator 
and repealed. A rate freeze was decreed till 2010.  
 
“Beginning  on  July  15,  2009,  and  each  year  thereafter,  the  corporation  must  make  a 
recommended actuarially sound rate filing for each personal and commercial line of business 
it writes, to be effective no earlier than January 1, 2010”.
13 
 
This  combination  of  an  institutionalised  rate  freeze  combined  with  the  reiteration  of  the 
request for “actuarially sound” rates is probably as good an indication as any of Citizens 
ambiguous position.  
 
                                                 
12   Florida Statute 627.351(6)(d) 
13   Florida Statutes 627.351(6).   10 
In  2006  Citizens  had  direct  written  premiums  of  US$  3.4  billion,  its  largest  voluntary 
competitor “State Farm Group” had US$1.4 billion. Given these orders of magnitude, it is 
hard to deny that Citizens has become a major market force in Florida. One could of course 
decide to still call it an “insurer of last resort”, but if so then for a large fraction of the total 
population. A task force has been set up to study how and to what extent this development can 
be reversed. The report is due in February 2009.  
 
  
II   Analysis  
 
Both  Citizens  and  the  FHCF  intensify  competition  on  the  Florida  property  (re)insurance 
market (especially for bad risks) and thus exert downward pressure on property (re)insurance 
premiums.  One  of  the  main  reasons  they  can  do  this  is  because  (by  law)  they  have  a 
possibility  private  (re)insurance  companies  do  not  have:  They  can  recuperate  their 
accumulated  losses  by  levying  a  surcharge  (an  assessment)  on  all  property  insurance 
contracts.  
 
The same point can be reformulated as follows: In a competitive environment, the private 
(re)insurance sector does not have the power to after the event increase its premiums to cover 
potential losses. Such losses thus have to be borne by their shareholders. The State can levy 
an assessment on the insurance customers, and thus cover its deficits ex post. The State can do 
this,  because  it  has  captive  customers.  The  individual  private  (re)insurer  cannot  do  this, 
because it does not have captive customers. 
 
To understand in more detail the effects this may have, let us start off by concentrating on the 
FHCF, and then in a second step turn to Citizens.   
 
 
A)   Intertemporal substitution 
 
One  way  of  interpreting  the  difference  in  approach  of  a  private  and  a  public  supplier  of 
reinsurance is from the perspective of intertemporal substitution. If the private reinsurance 
sector charges excessively high premiums because it overestimates the danger of a hurricane, 
this means that (ex post) the insurance companies and their customers (the property owners) 
have  paid  too  much.  If  the  FHCF  charges  insufficient  reinsurance  premiums  because  it 
underestimates the danger of a hurricane, this means that the future property owners have to 
pay too much (in the form of assessments to cover the deficits of the past).  
 
Of course, and this is an important point, these “future property owners” are by and large the 
same as the property owners who benefited from the low premiums in the first case.  
 
To  summarise,  in  the  one  case  we  have  (re)insurance  companies  who  have  accumulated 
reserves, i.e. some house owners who leave the region have paid insurance premiums that are 
“ex post” higher than the damage that occurred. These reserves are then (in theory) available 
to pay for the claims of the next generation. In summary, the previous generation pays for the 
next generation 
 
In the other case we have a state reinsurance company who can tax (assess) future house 
owners  to  recoup  the  deficits  it  has  accumulated.  The  customers  who  have  just  recently 
entered the market (bought a property) thus have to pay for the previous generation.    11 
 
B)   Cross-sectional redistribution 
 
As mentioned, the FHCF’s premium structure is, in principle, supposed to be actuarially fair. 
If this were in fact the case, one should observe that insurance companies with very different 
risk profiles purchase the same amount of reinsurance cover from the FHCF. In practice this 
does not seem to be the case. Over 40% of the FHCF’s business is with Citizens. This is 
strong evidence that the FHCF’s reinsurance conditions are particularly attractive for insurers 
with a high proportion of bad risk customers.  
 
There are thus two mechanisms by which the FHCF leads to an indirect subsidy of the “bad 
risks” by the “good risks”.  First the reinsurance premiums of the bad risk are not in fact 
sufficient to cover their expected costs, i.e. they are subsidised by the reinsurance premiums 
of the good risks. And second, when an assessment becomes necessary, the good risks further 
subsidise the bad risks. The assessments are proportional to the premiums and these, as we 
have just seen do not fully reflect the true underlying risk.  
 
C)   Property rights  
 
The FHCF as a public reinsurance company does not have a profit motive. Any profits it 
makes or reserves it accumulates by Statute have to stay in the Fund and are thus available for 
future claims payments.  
 
The situation is different in the case of a private reinsurance company. As a profit making 
enterprise its role is to generate profits for its share holders and pay these out in the form of 
dividends and/or share buy-backs. The fact that a group of reinsurance customers may have 
paid reinsurance premiums but has not had any claims payments, does not mean that this 
money is still around for future claims payments and will be used to reduce future reinsurance 
premiums. To the contrary: if there are good reasons to believe that the hurricane risk in a 
given geographic will increase, the reinsurance companies will increase their premiums, even 
if there have been no major claims in the preceding years. 
 
Alternatively  formulated,  with  a  state  reinsurance  supplier,  the  customers  know  that  on 
average  the  premiums  they  pay  will,  in  the  long  run,  be  equal  to  their  effective  claims 
payouts. With a private reinsurance sector, the premiums paid in may be substantially higher 
or substantially lower than the effective payout even for long periods of time.  
 
This problem will be particularly important if the probability of a major event occurring is 
quite low. For example, an event with an occurrence probability of 1 in 100 has a 26% chance 
of never occurring in any 30 year period.  
 
The  above  analysis  of  the  private  reinsurance  market  is  somewhat  mitigated  (but  not 
invalidated) by the introduction of financial capacity constraints. These modify the analysis as 
follows: when reinsurers have suffered large losses, their reserves are low and they have to 
rely more on financial markets to obtain funds. They price this increase in the cost of capital 
into their insurance premium. As a result, an increase in past losses will lead to an increase in 
future reinsurance premiums. This “capacity constraint theory” thus creates a link between 
past losses and future reinsurance premiums, even if the underlying probabilities have not 
changed.  
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D)   The expected cost of reinsurance  
 
There  may  be  substantial  differences  in  the  expected  cost  of  reinsurance  between  public 
reinsurance and private reinsurance companies. In the case of the FHCF the main danger 
would currently seem to be that the FHCF might tend to charge excessively low reinsurance 
premiums, thus imposing a potential burden on future customers.  
 
In  the  case  of  the  private  reinsurance  market  the  situation  is  different.  Since  private 
reinsurance companies cannot in principle cover their deficits with after-the-event premium 
increases,  they  have  to  calculate  their  reinsurance  premiums  with  a  forward  looking 
perspective.  
 
As mentioned above, the Wharton study (2008) has emphasised that reinsurance companies 
(just like primary insurers) cannot satisfy themselves with simply charging actuarially fair 
premiums. In particular, the study points out that they have to take into account the impact of 
an increase in the risks they take on their cost of capital. To put the point simply: if taking on 
an additional risk reduces the credit rating of a reinsurer, this increases the average cost of 
capital. The (re)insurer has to adequately take this increase in the average cost of capital into 
account when setting the price it charges for this additional risk. “For truly extreme risks, the 
resulting premium can be as much as 5 to 10 times higher than the expected loss, so as to 
provide investors with a fair return on equity...”
14 
 
The Wharton study further provides empirical evidence that reinsurance companies do not 
like parameter uncertainty, i.e. reinsurance premiums increase substantially when they are 
faced with such uncertainty. “A recent survey of actuaries and underwriters by the Wharton 
Risk Center revealed that insurers would charge 25 percent higher premiums for ambiguous 
risks than for risks with probabilities that were well specified.”
15 
 
One could reasonably argue that (the danger of) global warming has substantially increased 
the  parameter  uncertainty  surrounding  many  types  of  natural  catastrophes  including 
hurricanes. Parameter uncertainty should thus be of some relevance for hurricane insurance. 
  
Both of the above factors taken together would indicate that even in a competitive reinsurance 
market,  the  premiums  for  hurricane  insurance  may  well  be  considerably  higher  than  the 
expected  claims  costs.  This  raises  a  simple  question:  What  is  the  better  solution  for  the 
primary  insurance  customers?  Pay  premiums  that  are  (too)  low  to  a  public  reinsurance 
company, and bear the risk of having to pay assessments later on if the public reinsurer has 
insufficient funds? Or pay private reinsurance companies premiums that are a multiple of the 
expected claims costs, in return for not running the danger of such ex post assessments.  
 
The answer to this question will of course depend on the degree of risk spreading the public 
reinsurance company can operate. This pool is fortunately quite large. There are 5.7 million 
homeowner policies in Florida. Any assessment levied by the FHCF will thus be spread over 
a large number of policies, or alternatively formulated, the cost per policy is relatively low. 
One might of course argue that even so the cost of risk born by the individual household is 
still too large. If one believed this to be the case, the FHCF should try to purchase an adequate 
amount of reinsurance on the private market.  
 
                                                 
14   Wharton (2008) p.vii. 
15   Wharton (2008) p.vii.    13 
One of the major criticisms one might make of the Wharton study is that it completely fails to 
address  these  issues.  It  produces  good  arguments  why  one  should  expect  private  sector 
(re)insurance premiums for hurricanes to substantially exceed expected claims cost. It does 
not,  however,  go  the  next  step  and  address  the  question,  to  what  extent  the  cost  to  the 
population (the customers) might be lowered by appropriate state interventions. Potentially 
this is due to the fact that (some of) the authors have a strong affinity to the private insurance 
sector.  
 
To summarize, the major advantages of the FHCF are that it does not need to build up the 
same kind of reserves a private reinsurance company needs and it has a large pool of (captive) 
customers over which it can spread any deficits it might have. Furthermore, being a non-profit 
organisation it does not have to worry about obtaining an “adequate” return on capital. These 
elements  should  allow  it  to  provide  reinsurance  cover  at  much  lower  premiums  than  the 
private market. By doing so it reduces the part of the risk that has to be borne by the private 
market, i.e. the private reinsurance market will take on this residual risk at a (much) lower 
cost (over and above the expected claims costs) it would otherwise charge. The existence of 
the FHCF thus benefits the Florida property owners in two ways: a) directly by providing low 
cost  reinsurance  and  b)  indirectly  by  reducing  the  reinsurance  premiums  charged  on  the 
commercial market.  
 
The political support for the FHCF would presumably be much greater were it not for the fact 
that its current premium structure still has substantial redistributive effects. The “low risk” 
customers  (inland)  subsidise  the  high  risk  customers  (on  the  beach).  It  would  be  most 
regrettable  if  this  redistributive  effect  were  to  ultimately  lead  to  a  situation  where  the 
institution as a whole is menaced. A more balanced (actuarially sound) premium structure 
would permit the FHCF to continue performing its major useful role for the Florida property 
owners (lower the cost of reinsurance and thus the insurance premiums) while at the same 
time significantly reducing its political vulnerability.   
 
E)   Citizens 
 
Most of the arguments set out above for the FHCF are of course, mutatis mutandis, also valid 
for Citizens. It also has the ability to cover its deficits through ex post assessments.  There is, 
however,  one  important  difference.  The  FHCF  offers  low  cost  reinsurance  to  all  Florida 
insurance companies (and indeed taking out such reinsurance is compulsory). The group of 
individuals  covering  the  FHCF's  deficits  is  thus  by  and  large  the  same  as  the  group  of 
individuals benefiting from the reinsurance cover offered by the FHCF.  
 
For Citizens the situation is very different in this respect. While it is currently by far the 
largest  direct  property  insurer  in  Florida,  it  is  nevertheless  the  case  that  if  a  general 
assessment becomes necessary, most of the individuals having to pay this assessment are not 
themselves customers of Citizens. There is thus a certain amount of redistribution going on 
between these different groups of customers. Quantifying the extent of this redistribution is 
not, however, as simple as one might believe at first sight. By taking a large share of the high 
risk objects off the market, Citizens exerts substantial downward pressure on the level of 
insurance  premiums  (mainly  for  the  high  risks).  The  existence  of  Citizens  thus  has  a 
significant positive effect even on those property owners who are not themselves Citizens 
customers.  
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It is, of course, politically very easy to point at the “subsidised” rates Citizens customers are 
paying and then ask why the “average” Florida property owner should have to bear these 
costs. The truth is, however, somewhat more complicated. Building a house is a long term 
investment. Presumably, what the homeowner would like to purchase when making this long 
term investment decision is long term insurance cover. Unfortunately such cover is typically 
not available on the private market. The contracts offered by private insurance companies are 
usually very short term (one  year). The massive premium increases and cancellations the 
Florida market has experienced illustrate this. While it has always been the case that the 
hurricane risk on the beach was higher than further inland, the extent  of this risk  (or its 
perception) has massively increased over the last decade. It is this (unexpected) increase in the 
(perceived) hurricane risk that has led to the massive increase in premiums.  
 
It is perfectly valid to argue that the State should to a certain extent fill the gap left by the fact 
that the private insurance sector is unwilling (or unable) to offer long term cover. The most 
obvious way of doing this is to absorb part of the unanticipated premium increases the house-
owners in the most exposed areas have to cope with. That is of course precisely the role 
Citizens is performing. 
 
To summarize, Citizens (just like the FHCF) substantially reduces the pressure on the Florida 
hurricane insurance market by  absorbing a large fraction of the most exposed risks. This 
should  have  the  effect  of  improving  the  availability  of  cover  and  reducing  the  average 
premium rate for all house-owners and not just its own customers. Citizens’ ability to spread 
its cost of risk over a large population (more than 5.7 million homeowner policies) via ex-post 
assessments means that it can operate with substantially lower risk premiums than private 
insurance companies.  
 
The following quote indicates that the empirical magnitude of this effect is substantial: “State 
insurance regulators have recommended insurance companies use a 3.7 profit margin - not 
including  income  earned  on  investments  -  to  calculate  property  insurance  prices.  But 
executives from companies such as Allstate Floridian, Nationwide and Hartford Insurance Co. 
of the Midwest testified that they used profit margins of 15 percent or more to calculate rate 
requests last year. What's more, Hartford officials said they used $1 billion last year to buy 
back stock. Allstate also has bought back stock in recent years.”
16 
 
Finally, Citizens can alleviate the burden of sudden unanticipated premium increases private 
insurers tend to impose on their customers. There is thus a number or very good reasons for 
the policy maker to continue supporting this institution.  
 
This  conclusion  is  sharply  different  to  the  policy  recommendations  one  can  find  in  the 
Wharton  study.  “..This  reinforces  an  important  point.  Florida  cannot  rely  on  small  or 
geographically  concentrated  insurers  to  underwrite  a  large  number  of  homes  in  high  risk 
areas. A more sustainable approach is to encourage a large number of insurers to each write a 
‘reasonable’ number of homes in high risk areas, commensurate with the capacity and risk 
diversification of each company. Of course saying this is easier said than done. However, if 
regulators allow insurers to charge fully adequate, risk based rates and make other reasonable 
adjustments  in  their  underwriting  and  policy  terms,  insurers  should  be  more  amenable  to 
writing a manageable amount of high risk exposures” (Wharton, 2008, p 76). 
 
                                                 
16   http://aminthemorning.blogspot.com/2008/02/insurance-companies-in-florida-used.html   15 
Nobody disputes that the private insurance sector would be willing to cover even the most 
exposed buildings in Florida if they could set sufficiently high premiums. Experience has 
shown, however, that the State can significantly lower the expected cost of insurance for the 
population  as  a  whole  by  intelligently  intervening  in  this  market  (where  the  extent  of 
“uninsurable” risk is exceptionally high). The FHCF and Citizens are the two key institutions 
through  which  the  State  can  achieve  such  improvements  in  market  performance.  The 
argument that similar cover can be obtained from the private market at a substantially higher 
cost  to  the  customer  can  hardly  be  considered  an  “in-depth  analysis  of  the  efficiency  of 
current disaster insurance markets.”
17  
 
F)   Problems of moral hazard 
 
a.  Temptation 
 
As mentioned, major hurricanes may be low probability events, but they can be extremely 
costly. There may be several years in a row with almost no claims costs and others where they 
can be of the order of several billion dollars.  
 
In principle, one could argue that if the premiums are set at an adequate rate, the insurance 
companies should in the “good years” be able to form sufficient reserves to cover their excess 
costs in the “bad years”. There are, however, several problems with this general principle. 
First and foremost, if a company has generated more premiums than claims in any given year, 
at least part of this difference (the profit) legally belongs to the insurance company. While 
solid business practice indicates that it should set aside a large part of this surplus there is no 
legal  obligation  to  do  so.  According  to  the  state  legislator,  this  is  not  just  a  theoretical 
possibility: “The insolvencies and financial impairments resulting from Hurricane Andrew 
demonstrate  that  many  property  insurers  are  unable  or  unwilling  to  maintain  reserves, 
surplus, and reinsurance
18 sufficient to enable the insurers to pay all claims in full in the 
event of a catastrophe. State action is therefore necessary to protect the public from insurer's 
unwillingness or inability to maintain sufficient reserves, surplus, and reinsurance.”
19  
 
Given the events on the financial markets in the course of last year, one can reasonably argue 
that this “unwillingness to maintain sufficient reserves” seems to characterise large parts of 
our financial system. The massive injections of public funds into the financial sector (over 
US$2'000 billion for the US, a similar amount for the EU, CHF 68 billion just for the bank 
UBS etc.) is eloquent testimony to this effect. The previous decade’s profits were not used to 
increase the reserves of the financial institutions. Rather they were distributed to shareholders 
and management in the form of dividends, share buy-backs and huge bonuses. The result was 
a substantial increase in the leverage of the financial system as a whole. The tax-payer, and 
the economy in general were left to foot a truly massive bill at the first significant downturn.  
 
b.  Design 
 
The  temptation  to  pay  out  dividends  rather  than  accumulate  profits  is  one  problem.  In  a 
competitive market for catastrophe insurance one may, however, also encounter insurers who 
have a deliberate strategy to this effect. “Fly-by-night” insurance companies may attempt to 
enter  the  market  with  aggressive  pricing  strategies  that  do  not  allow  them to  cover  their 
                                                 
17   Wharton (2008) Preface. 
18   Italics by the authors. 
19   Florida Statutes 215.555.   16 
effective exposure. They are then forced to leave the market when the first major event hits 
them.  In  Florida  the  rapid  expansion  of  the  Poe  insurance  company  (300  million  US$ 
premium income in 2004) and its bankruptcy in 2005 provides a vivid illustration of this.  
 
The Wharton study describes this episode as follows: “The story of the Poe companies is a 
good illustration of the ‘go for broke’ strategy that some insurers employ when they encounter 
financial difficulty. Poe insured more than 300'000 homes, with most concentrated in the 
high-risk areas of Palm Beach, Broward and Miami-Dade counties. Despite major losses from 
the  2004  storms  and  declining  capital,  Poe  aggressively  added  more  policies  in  2005, 
gambling  that  it  would  not  incur  more  storm  losses.  Such  gambling  is  encouraged  by  a 
regulatory  system,  in  which  an  insurer  can  shift  its  losses  to  the  state  (i.e.  insurance 
companies and tax payers) through the insolvency guaranty association. The insurer reaps the 
potential upside of such gambles while subjecting the public to the potential downside. This 
scenario  became  reality  when  the  Poe  companies  became  insolvent  after  the  2005  storm 
season, generating approximately $750 million in guaranty association assessments.” 
20 
 
This analysis is not quite correct: From the perspective of insurance companies like Poe, 
whether or not a guaranty association exists really makes no difference. They know that in 
either case they can take their profits in the “good years” and file for bankruptcy when in a 
“bad  year”" they have insufficient funds to pay their claims. The only way to effectively 
prevent  such  behaviour  is  to  impose  a  much  tighter  regulatory  framework  governing  the 
extent of reinsurance companies have to buy and the possibilities of paying out “profits” in 
those years with no major event. Surprisingly the Wharton analysis does not wish to draw this 
conclusion.  
 
The absence of a guaranty association would have an influence only insofar as it would force 
the customers to more carefully check the financial situation of the insurance company with 
whom they contract. Given the complexity of analysing the financial health of a real world 
insurance company, one may doubt whether this is really an efficient solution to the problem. 
One might try to argue that purchasing cover only from the larger insurance companies could 
help to alleviate this problem. There are two problems with this argument. First, the Wharton 
study strongly suggests that it is not healthy to concentrate too much of the catastrophic risk 
with just a few companies. Second the recent events around AIG and its US$150 billion 
bailout illustrate that even large companies are by no means immune to bankruptcy. They just 
leave a bigger hole when they go down!  
 
III   Conclusion 
 
Florida  has  an  exceptionally  strong  exposition  to  hurricane  risk.  Such  risks  are  typically 
referred  to  as  “uninsurable”.  The  substantial  increase  in  hurricane  damage  has  led  to  a 
massive  increase  in  premiums  and  a  shortage  of  insurance  cover  for  the  more  exposed 
homeowners. This increase was totally unanticipated, i.e. the homeowners are currently in the 
situation of having to face huge premium increases (and policy cancellations) because long 
term insurance cover is not available.  
 
The Wharton study’s policy suggestions, as to how Florida should cope with this situation, are 
of only limited scope. It is almost tautological to argue that the private insurance sector would 
be willing to provide cover, if only the premiums were allowed to rise fast enough.   
                                                 
20   Wharton (2008) p. 70.   17 
 
The higher the legislator allows the premiums to rise, the greater the danger that “fly-by-
night” insurance companies accumulate large portfolios in a short time by offering attractive 
rates. They pay out part of their reserves in the forms of dividends or bonuses and then go 
bankrupt when a major event hits.  
 
The State of Florida has created two institutions, the FHCF and Citizens, to partly solve these 
problems. Between them they take up a large chunk of the hurricane risk. Their existence 
substantially  reduces  the  pressure  and  lowers  the  premiums  on  the  private  market.  Their 
ability to charge lower premiums is based on the fact that they can cover potential deficits by 
resorting to assessments on all policy holders. This effectively allows them to spread the risks 
they take over a larger number of stakeholders.  
 
There is every reason to believe that significantly reducing the role of these two institutions 
can come only at a substantial cost to the property owners as a group. The challenge is thus to 
fine-tune the financial terms on which they operate in such a way as to keep the political 
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